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Abstract 
This study investigates the completion of the Ph.D. in Economics.  We use ex ante information, 
based solely upon reviewing a set of individual applications from former doctoral students. 
Estimation for determining success is done by logit, multinomial logit, and generalized ordered 
logit.  We find that students need different skills and attributes to succeed at each distinct and 
sequential stage of the doctoral program.  Significant determinants for passing the 
comprehensive exams include high GRE verbal and quantitative scores, a Masters degree, and a 
prior focus on economics.  Research motivation and math preparation play significant roles in 
completing the dissertation, but having a Masters degree and economics preparation becomes 
insignificant.  GRE scores disappear as a significant determinant for completion in the 
generalized ordered logit estimates, which emphasize the sequential nature of the Economics 
Ph.D. program.  
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Survive Then Thrive: Talent, Research Motivation, and Completing the Economics Ph.D. 
 
1. Introduction 
Every spring a global talent search occurs when doctoral admission committees pore over 
applications to select candidates for their Ph.D. programs.1  Beyond normal attrition, Economics 
departments clearly have a stake in seeing a significant proportion of students finish the program.  
Aside from wherever additional university resources may accrue to departments with high 
completion rates, professors and departments receive prestige and gratification from the 
placement and success of their completed Ph.D. students in good academic institutions or private 
sector jobs.  Since pursuing a doctorate in economics constitutes a much riskier venture than 
attending medical school, an MBA program, or law school (Ehrenberg, 1992), information that 
helps identify success in completing the Ph.D. has significant value to doctoral admission 
committees, departments, and administrators.2  The nature of the Economics Ph.D. program 
implies greater risk relative to these alternatives.  For rather than satisfying a singular threshold 
or set of criteria, obtaining a Ph.D., like many training programs, requires clearing a series of 
distinct hurdles.   
This paper empirically investigates what determines successful completion of the 
Economics Ph.D.  The data we use is retrieved from individual files of former Ph.D. students at 
Syracuse University (Carnegie Classification: Doctoral Research Universities II-Extensive).  Our 
study breaks new ground in several areas.  First, it consists of an ex ante study of variables that 
determine doctoral degree completion.  It exclusively uses information known by the admission 
committee at the time of the selection process.  Second, in addition to demographic information 
and GRE scores, we extract from this data a number of variables that have never been used in 
doctoral success studies.  Third, we examine success for each of the three distinct and sequential 
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stages of the Ph.D. program.  This approach can be applied to other sequentially structured 
training programs.  Fourth, this study provides results for a mid-level program rather than an 
elite one.  In so doing, it focuses on the class of programs that produce the vast majority of 
Ph.D.s in Economics.  
Although the Economics Ph.D. has been awarded for over a century in the United States, 
surprisingly little scientific evidence has been obtained on the set of skills and attributes that best 
predict who will earn a doctorate in economics.3  Empirical work on this topic is meager 
primarily because existing studies include little data of students’ aptitude and attributes.   In 
addition, the few compiled data sets of doctoral completion (e.g. Ehrenberg, 1992) use either 
data from select elite institutions or highly aggregated data sets that do not identify individual 
institutions.  
Bowen and Rudenstine (1992) amassed data on all entrants to graduate programs in six 
fields, including economics, at ten research universities over a 25-year period.4  Using two-way 
comparisons of means they show that completion rates depended on the primary type of financial 
support the students received, department size (smaller was better), and varied markedly by 
discipline.5  Using a duration model, Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) confirm the importance of 
financial support for completion rates of Cornell University Ph.D. students in four disciplines, 
including economics, over a 24 year period.  Among economics students, completion rates were 
highest for those with research assistantships, then for fellowships, and the least likely for 
teaching assistants.6  In addition, they find that completion rates are higher for entering students 
with master degrees, lower for Americans, but unrelated to student ability as measured by GRE 
scores.  Booth and Satchell (1995), in a retrospective national data set (individual institutions 
were not identified) of over 480 students who began British Ph.D. programs in 1980, also 
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reached the conclusion that measured student quality does not affect completion rates. 7   In 
contrast to Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995), though, they also find that financial support (i.e., 
research council funding) failed to influence the likelihood of finishing the degree.  
Our study takes a different approach.  The authors in the foregoing papers all estimate 
how changes in doctoral students’ lives during the course of their study (e.g., sources of funding, 
grades in the Ph.D. program, marriage, children, job prospects of those with the doctorate, etc) 
influence the probability of completing the degree.8  Instead, we investigate the determinants of 
student outcomes ex ante to their entry in the program.  The variables that we use come directly 
from the application files, the information known to the selection committee at the time of 
selecting candidates in the spring.  The only other ex ante study in this area that we are aware of 
is Krueger and Wu (2000), who estimate what characteristics of the more than 300 applicants to 
Princeton’s Economics Ph.D. program determine admission and subsequent job placement.   
To better measure the set of skills and attributes necessary to complete a Ph.D. in 
Economics, our study analyzes a rich set of individual-level data extracted directly from the 
application files.  Studies in this area typically rely on institutional records (e.g. Bowen and 
Rudenstine 1992, Ehrenberg and Mavros 1995).  While this work has the virtue of analyzing 
multiple departments and (with the former) multiple universities, it contains limited information 
about individual ability, as both these sets of authors lament.  Following the advice of Ehrenberg 
and Mavros (1995), we use “additional information about a student’s true ability.”  Besides 
demographic variables and GRE scores, our data set -- taken from individual student application 
forms, transcripts, and personal statements -- enables us to test for a remarkably wide array of 
determinants for success in an Economics Ph.D. program.   
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As another distinction, we focus on the various stages in the Economics Ph.D. program.  
Our data set contains information on individual outcomes for each of the three major steps: 
Theory Comprehensive Exam, Field Comprehensive Exam, and Completion of the Dissertation.  
Rather than treat success either as earn or fail to earn the doctorate or analyze how the 
probabilities change each year, we separately estimate what characteristics predict success at 
each stage of the Ph.D. program.  The emphasis on each stage is fundamentally important given 
the structure of most Ph.D. programs in economics, but has not been examined in any existing 
empirical literature we are aware of.  Thus, while we define ultimate success as completing the 
doctoral program, we empirically investigate whether students need different skill sets to pass the 
comprehensive exams, as opposed to what is needed to pursue an original research project and 
finish the dissertation.   
As a final difference between this study and others, we examine students at a mid-level 
program rather than at elite Economics Ph.D. departments as is the case with Ehrenberg and 
Mavros (1995), Krueger and Wu (1989), Bowen and Rudenstine (1992), and Espenshade and 
Rodriguez (1997).  With this feature, our data may provide more variation that lend themselves 
to study of the production of Economics Ph.D.s.  For example, top censoring may limit the 
usefulness of many important determinants at places like Princeton where the mean score of 
admitted students for the GRE Quantitative Exam was 774 out of a maximum of 800  (Krueger 
and Wu, 1989, Table 1, 84).  Our results are of particular importance to the large number of 
Economics Ph.D.s produced outside the very elite.9  In 2003, programs outside the top ten 
produced 78 percent of that year’s doctorates in Economics (National Science Foundation 2005, 
Roessler 2005).  In this regard, our study provides a blueprint for individual departments to make 
their own analyses as to what determines success in completing the Ph.D.   
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Section 2 introduces our models and discusses the variables we extract from the graduate 
student files.  In section 3, we empirically investigate the determinants of doctoral student 
success at each stage of evaluation.  We use three estimation techniques: logit, multinomial logit, 
and generalized ordered logit.  While each of the three methods provides its own interpretation, 
generalized ordered logit in particular emphasizes the sequential nature of the Ph.D. economics 
program.  In general we find that students who pass the comprehensive exams exhibit intellectual 
firepower (high verbal and quantitative GRE scores), have a Masters degree, and focused on 
economics as reflected in the number of economics courses taken beforehand.  But having 
passed the comprehensive exams, what it took to complete the degree was strong research 
motivation and more math preparation.  We find that research motivation, measured by whether 
the student mentioned in their personal statement a paper that they had done, is a significant 
indicator for successful completion of the dissertation.  The significant determinants of passing 
the comps generally become insignificant for the dissertation step. 
In section 4 we use factor analysis to extract seven “factors,” or underlying latent 
behavioral variables, from our data set.  We conduct the same analysis as in section 3 using the 
factors.  Our logit and multinomial logit results tell the same straightforward story: overall 
intelligence plays a significant role in success for each step, but completing the dissertation also 
requires motivation and research desire.  The findings from generalized ordered logit estimation 
affirm those results and provide evidence that passing the comprehensive exams additionally 
requires math talent.   
All told, then, we find that students need different skills for success at the various stages 
of the doctoral program.  Surviving the comprehensive exams requires talent and acquired tools.  
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To thrive in the dissertation stage, though, additionally requires motivation for doing economics 
research.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Models and Data 
 The models we investigate can all be expressed in the following form.  For the ith 
student, as i = 1, 2, … , T, the probability of success is in the jth step is given by: 
 
),()|( ' jiii xFxSuccessP β=      (1) 
 
where the qualitative variable Success is a measure of success which may be binary (e.g. Pass 
versus Fail) or ordinal (e.g. Failed Theory Comprehensive Exam, Passed Theory Comp But Did 
Not Complete, Completed Dissertation), F is a cumulative distribution function, x is a vector of 
exogenous variables for the individual which affect the outcome, and β is the parameter vector.  
A more explicit description of the model specifications for each of the estimation procedures 
appears in the Appendix. 
The equation falls into the class of limited dependent variable models. The underlying 
latent dependent variable can be regarded as the cumulative number of unobservable 
“performance units” that determine success.  If the student’s performance units meet or exceed 
the department standard, the student succeeds or passes; otherwise he/she fails.  Given  the 
student’s ex ante characteristics, he/she acquires these performance units in the graduate program 
based upon academic ability, work ethic, and behavioral or emotional characteristics. 
We obtain the data by reviewing all the available individual files of recent Ph.D. students 
in the Syracuse University economics department.  The sample consists entirely of students that 
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completed all the requirements, left the program voluntarily, or failed the theory or field 
comprehensive exam in two attempts.  It includes no current students in the program, even if 
they have finished one or more steps.  As a result, the sample size is the same for all our 
estimations.  Extracting this detailed individual information from well-over 100 files yields 78 
observations with data for all the outcome variables and determinants.    
Summary statistics appear in Table 1.  Overall, we find the sample means and variation in 
the data reasonably representative of the Ph.D. program at Syracuse.  The first three rows of data 
consist of the Success or outcome variables, which encompass the major steps in the Ph.D. 
program.  The variable Theory Comp equals one if the student passed the Theory Comprehensive 
Exam, zero otherwise.  Field Comp and Completed are defined correspondingly, based upon the 
Field Comprehensive Exam and the Dissertation.  We do not distinguish between whether the 
student passed the Theory or Field Comp on the first or second attempt.   
To avoid giving up too many observations and degrees of freedom, we made several 
choices regarding the outcome variables.  Students who left the program before attempting a 
given step receive a value of 0 for this outcome. Some students in this group decided that they do 
not have the performance units to reach the expected standard and decided not to try.  Others 
who transferred from the program before attempting the outcome (they receive a 1 on any 
previous outcomes in which they succeeded) may have the necessary academic abilities to 
succeed, but did not seek to obtain the necessary performance units through study.  We make no 
effort to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary leavers, since our goal is to evaluate 
what determines which students completed the degree in this program.  
The sequential structure of the Economics Ph.D. program implies that for all students, the 
steps appear in the same distinct order—Theory Comprehensive exam, Field Exam, and 
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Completion (of dissertation).  The program does not allow a student to even attempt a step until 
they have succeeded in all the previous ones.  This property implies dependence within the 
outcome variables.  Observations where Completed equals 1 necessarily have values of 1 for the 
other two outcome variables.  For the same reason, observations with values of 0 for any 
outcome have zeros as well for subsequent outcomes.   
The remaining variables in Table 1 make up the determinants of success.  The next block 
consists of determinants other than dummy variables for citizenship.  The first three variables in 
this group are the student’s GRE scores—Verbal, Quantitative, and Analytic.10  These variables 
represent performance on standardized tests and are required for all applicants to the Syracuse 
Ph.D. program.  They might be regarded as measures of innate aptitude.   
Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) argue that GRE scores poorly measure student quality, 
which accounts for the lack of association with degree completion in their study.  The absence 
of a statistically significant relationship between GRE score and degree completion is also 
reported by Zwick (1991), Zwick and Braun (1988), and Dawes (1975).  On the other hand, 
Attiyeh and Attiyeh (1997) and Krueger and Wu (2000) show that GRE scores, especially from 
the quantitative section, strongly predict admission to economics doctoral programs.  But if 
these standardized test scores do not predict degree completion, then the use of GRE scores by 
institutions of higher education may be, as McCloskey (1994) comments, merely placing 
“crowns on the heads of the ‘brightest,” so measured at age 21.  Hansen (1971) finds a larger 
role of the quality of the undergraduate institution and GPA than for GRE scores, but GRE 
quantitative scores help to predict second year grades and who continues to the second year.11  
Krueger and Wu (2000) show that GRE scores, especially from the quantitative section, are a 
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statistically significant predictor of applicants’ subsequent job placement—perhaps the ultimate 
measure of success.12   
The next two variables come from our examination of the students’ transcripts and are 
not used in other studies to our knowledge.  The variable Math Courses refers to the number of 
courses in the mathematics department Calculus I or above that appear in the student’s transcript.  
Similarly, Econ Courses denote the number of economics courses the student has taken.  With 
either variable, we do not distinguish whether the student had taken them as a matriculated 
undergraduate, after graduation, or in a graduate program.  Consequently, one student who 
majored in economics as an undergraduate and completed two Masters programs amassed 40 
courses in the subject!13   
The dummy variable Masters equals 1 if the student had a Masters degree coming into 
the Ph.D. program.  Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) find that possession of a Masters degree 
increases completion rates for Economics Ph.D.s at Cornell.  Note that test scores and transcript 
information all come from institutional records, rather than from student surveys.  The results of 
Maxwell and Lopus (1994) indicate that students’ systematically overestimate self-reported 
aptitude information. 
 The next three variables come from careful reading of the individual student’s personal 
statement, and have not been included in any other doctoral completion papers.  The variable 
Mention Paper equals 1 if the student referred to a paper they had done in their personal 
statement, 0 otherwise.  The paper they mention could be from an undergraduate course they had 
taken, a senior thesis, a Masters project or thesis, or a project in which they had participated in as 
a research assistant.  This variable is an indicator of the student’s demonstrated interest in doing 
 11
economics research, which possibly motivated them to pursue the Ph.D.  It turns out to be a 
significant determinant of success, especially in completing the dissertation. 
 We extracted data from the personal statements on two other determinants.  Specific 
Topic equals 1 if the statement mentions one or more specific topics that the student possibly 
wishes to study, 0 otherwise.  Although this does not have to be the topic they ultimately will 
pursue for their dissertation, the variable provides a measure of research focus.  Specific Member 
equals 1 if the personal statement lists one or more department members whose work interests 
the student, 0 otherwise.  This variable measures departmental familiarity and the potential for 
effective matching with a dissertation advisor.14   The next two variables are standard 
demographic measures—Age denotes the student’s age in calendar years when he/she began the 
Ph.D. program, and Female equals 1 if female, 0 if male.15     
The last six variables consist of dummy variables for citizenship.  Our classifications are 
American, Chinese, Other Pacific Rim (e.g. South Korea), Other Asian (e.g. India, Pakistan), 
European (including Turkey), and Middle Eastern/African.  The sample consists of nearly 60% 
American students.  This percentage may be higher than found in many Ph.D. programs, but is 
historically representative of the Syracuse program, especially with its emphasis within the 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs on policy-oriented research. 
 
3.  Empirical Results: Determinants of Success  
This section presents findings from estimating limited dependent variable models 
involving the distinct steps in the Ph.D. program.  The determinants come from the variables 
listed in Table 1.  For purposes of examining as many determinants as possible, we include all 
the characteristics for each outcome. 
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 We also include several interaction terms, interacting GRE Quantitative with GRE 
Analytic, Math Courses, and Econ Courses.  These terms test for a possible “compensation 
effect,” involving students who seek Ph.D. study in economics but have a low GRE Quantitative 
score.  If the GRE Quantitative exam measures quantitative aptitude, demonstrating analytic 
ability or bulking up on math or economics courses may increase the probability of success more 
strongly for students deficient in this attribute. 
 To illustrate how this behavior works within the model, consider for example the effect 
of Math Courses.  Let α1 and α2 be the parameters corresponding to Math Courses on its own 
and the interaction of Math Courses and GRE Quantitative.  Then the marginal effect of Math 
Courses on the probability of success includes the term  
 
α1 + α2(GRE Quantitative),    (2) 
 
and carries the same sign as well.   
The compensation effect implies that α1 > 0 and α2 < 0.  The marginal effect has positive 
sign only if GRE Quantitative is less than the threshold value of -α1/α2.  Thus, math courses only 
help students with relatively low GRE Quantitative scores.  In addition, a lower GRE 
Quantitative score generates a marginal effect with larger magnitude.  Math courses taken 
beforehand have a stronger effect on the probability of success for students who are more 
deficient in quantitative aptitude.    
Before proceeding to the estimations, we must address several econometric issues 
inherent to studies of this type.  Two potential selection problems arise, because we do not 
observe the outcomes of all students who apply for the program in Syracuse. The first selection 
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problem occurs in the decision to offer admission, since only a limited set of individuals are 
picked. The second selection problem results from decisions made by students once the offer was 
made, as most get offers from other schools and many choose not to enter the Syracuse program. 
 To receive an offer, a student must meet certain threshold criteria. Therefore, because the 
program makes offers to a select group of candidates, they may be systematically different than 
the group that was not selected.  However, since students who did not get accepted are screened 
on the basis of their applications materials alone, the selection is based purely on observable 
factors. Therefore controlling for observed characteristics in the estimations lets us control for 
selection on observables (Angrist and Krueger 1999).  Controlling for selection applies to 
students who were not given the offer either because they were regarded as too weak or because 
they were regarded as a bad fit with the program (e.g. differences in field interests versus 
offerings). 
 However, another selection problem may arise when students have offers from Syracuse 
University but choose not to enroll in the program.  If students who enter the program are 
systematically different from students who do not come, then selection would be done on 
unobservable characteristics, and the estimated coefficients for success could be biased.  For 
example, a student's success may be based not only on the characteristics observed by the 
admission committee, but other characteristics such as motivation or persistence.  Only the 
individual student has complete information on his/her entire set of qualities.  And if they have 
an offer from a higher ranked program, the more ambitious students may systematically choose 
that program over Syracuse.  Therefore, students who choose Syracuse may have the same 
values for observable characteristics like GRE scores or number of math courses as students who 
do not come to Syracuse, but may have lower probability of success.   
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 Like most studies in this and related areas, we do not attempt to correct for potential 
selection problems.  In this way, we estimate the effects observed for individuals who have 
chosen to join the Syracuse University program.  We assume that the unobservable 
characteristics for selection are not correlated with the independent variables in the model, so our 
coefficients have the interpretation of partial correlation coefficients. 
 The models are estimated using Version 7 of Stata.  All models employ the Huber-White 
sandwich variance-covariance estimator to produce standard errors that correct for 
heteroskedasticity (White 1980).  Estimated models in this section include a constant term and 
citizenship dummy variables for all groups except Other Asian, although their parameter 
estimates are not reported in the Tables.16  
 We begin by estimating the probability of success at each of the three separate stages in 
the Ph.D. program.  This set of estimations focuses on the following probabilities independently: 
 
                         
( )
( )
( ).onDissertati Completed
,Exam Field Passed
,Exam iveComprehensTheory  Passed
=
=
=
SuccessP
SuccessP
SuccessP
 
 
Logit estimations for determinants of success appear in Table 2 (probit estimations generate very 
similar results).  The Table reports estimates of equation (1) with the binary variable Pass versus 
Fail, for each stage of the Ph.D. program.   
 For the Theory Comprehensive Exam, the findings show significantly positive effects for 
GRE Verbal and Quantitative exams and for having a Masters degree.  The effect of GRE Verbal 
is much smaller in magnitude relative to GRE Quantitative.  The results suggest a possible 
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compensation effect for GRE Analytic, but not for either math courses or economics courses.  
None of the personal statement variables show significant effects.      
 Moving to the Field Comprehensive exam, we find similar results.  The variables GRE 
Verbal and GRE Quantitative again have significantly positive effects, with magnitudes similar 
to the estimates for the Theory Comp.  None of the personal statement variables turn up 
significant as well.  But several results differ from those of the Theory Comprehensive Exam.  
Possession of a Masters degree does not significantly help to pass the Field Exam.  And the 
results indicate a compensation effect for economics courses. 
 Estimates for success in the last step, Completion, generate several notable distinctions as 
well.  GRE Quantitative remains a significant determinant, but GRE Verbal no longer plays a 
significant role.  The coefficients of GRE Analytic and Math Courses are significant with 
evidence of compensation effects, but the results provide little evidence regarding economics 
courses.  In addition, the variable Mention Paper has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of completion.  The overall results indicate that quantitative talent and preparation 
along with interest in writing research papers are the most important determinants of success in 
completing the Ph.D. program. 
 The estimations for passing the Field Exam generate a compensation effect for taking 
economics courses with a plausible threshold GRE Quantitative score of approximately 692, just 
about equal to the sample average.  The threshold GRE Quantitative score for the GRE Analytic 
approximately equals 702 for Completion.  At the same stage, the findings indicate an estimated 
threshold for math courses of GRE Quantitative = 743.   
 The logit estimations investigate the significant determinants for completion of each 
stage, but have little to say about where the student ultimately ends up in the program.  Some 
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students who pass the theory comprehensive exam will go on and pass the field comprehensive 
exam, some won’t.  Some students who pass the field comp will ultimately complete the 
dissertation, some won’t.   
To address this issue, we perform multinomial logit estimation.  This procedure moves 
toward examining the terminal outcomes of students in the Ph.D. program, and the variables that 
determine where students place into the separate categories.  In the context of the Ph.D. program, 
one generally classifies terminal outcomes into four categories – exam failures, or students who 
failed the theory comp; passers on the theory comp but not the field comp; passers on both 
comprehensive exams who did not complete the dissertation; and those who completed. 
We make a couple of compromises due to data limitations.  First, we don’t have enough 
observations for students who passed the theory comp but not the field comp.  Thus we work 
with three categories—Exam Failures; Passed Comp(s) Did Not Complete; and Completed.  The 
middle classification consists of students with a 1 on the variable Theory Comp and a 0 on 
Completed.  We find very similar results for estimations when we replace the middle category 
with Passed Field Comp Did Not Complete.  Second, since all variables in the estimation must 
be represented in all categories, we need to drop the variables European and Specific Member.  
We make the same adjustments for the estimations in Table 4.   
The multinomial logit in our context, then, takes the form of simultaneous estimation of 
the probabilities: 
 
    
( )( )

==
==
.Failure Exam  versusCompleted
,Failure Exam  versusCompleteNot  Did Comp(s) Passed
FailureSuccessP
FailureSuccessP
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As Maddala (1998) explains, the multinomial logit technique for three categories can be regarded 
as extending a two-step procedure involving logit estimation of limited dependent variable 
models.  In the context of our model, we use Exam Failures as the basis category.  Step one 
would consist of logit estimation of Passed Comp(s) Did Not Complete versus Exam Failures.  
Step two would then perform logit estimation of Completed versus Exam Failures.  Hence, the 
estimates investigate the significant determinants of what propels students beyond the point of 
failing the theory comprehensive exam.  The multinomial logit extends the two-step procedure 
by performing joint estimation, preserving estimator consistency while improving efficiency. 
 Findings for the multinomial logit in Table 3 largely reinforce the results in Table 2.  
Scores on all three GRE exams are significant determinants of whether students pass one or more 
of the comprehensive exams but did not complete the program, with significantly positive effects 
for GRE Verbal and GRE Quantitative.  Having a Masters degree is a significantly positive 
determinant for the middle category as well.  The parameter for Age also comes in significant for 
the first time, being younger increasing the probability of landing in the middle category relative 
to failing the Theory Comp.  The estimated coefficients for both variables involving math 
courses are significant at the 10% level but opposite in sign from what the compensation effect 
predicts.   
 For placing in the Completed category relative to failing the Theory Comp, all GRE 
Variables have significant effects with the Verbal and Quantitative significantly positive.  Here 
we find evidence of significant compensation effects with Math Courses, Econ Courses, and 
GRE Analytic.  The effects of Masters becomes insignificant for landing in the Completed 
category.  And as in the logit estimations, the results indicate that Mention Paper has a 
significantly positive effect upon completion.   
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 Where significant compensation effects occur, the estimated thresholds for the GRE 
Quantitative score are generally lower relative to the logit estimations.  The threshold for GRE 
Analytic in the middle category is for a GRE Quantitative score equal to 567, and 489 for GRE 
Analytic in the Completed category.  The estimated threshold with math courses in the 
Completed category is GRE Quantitative = 480.  Econ courses in the Completed category 
generate a more plausible threshold of  639.      
 The estimated low GRE Quantitative thresholds for the math courses and GRE Analytic 
may suggest behavior in addition to the compensation effect.  The estimates in fact suggest 
negative effects on the probability of success for students with GRE Quantitative scores above 
the threshold who have taken more math courses or have a higher GRE Analytic exam.  While 
the compensation effect holds for students with GRE Quant scores below these thresholds, why 
might students with better GRE Analytic scores and more math courses have a decreased 
probability of success?  Apart from shortcomings in the data and the multinomial logit technique 
for this application, two behaviors might account for these findings. 
 The first involves transferring from the program.  More talented students who get into the 
Syracuse Ph.D. program and take some courses may decide to seek entry in a higher ranked 
program.  At Syracuse we encounter some of this behavior, but not to a frequent extent.  The 
second consists of adverse selection by very talented applicants who choose Syracuse over 
higher ranked programs.  These students may have superb paper credentials but may lack 
motivation or work ethic, so they opt for a “less challenging” program.  They quickly (and 
frequently to their dismay) learn that all respectable Ph.D. Economics programs demand from 
their students substantial amounts of aptitude, time, and work effort. 
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Our next estimation again examines terminal outcomes, but emphasizes the sequential 
nature of the Ph.D. program.  We employ the generalized ordered logit.  The procedure is an 
extension of the ordered logit technique, by allowing for the possibility of differential effects of 
independent variables on success probabilities at each stage.  We use the same three categories as 
in the multinomial logit—Exam Failures, Passed Comp(s) Did Not Complete, and Completed.   
Like the multinomial logit, the generalized ordered logit extends a two-step procedure by 
joint estimation as explained in Maddala (1998).  In the context of our problem, step one consists 
of logit estimation of Passed Comp(s) Did Not Complete versus Exam Failures.  But with the 
generalized ordered logit, step two consists of logit estimation of Completed versus Passed 
Comp(s) Did Not Complete, respectively assigned values of 1 and 0.  Therefore we 
simultaneously estimate the following probabilities: 
 
( )( )

==
==
.CompleteNot  Did Comp(s) Passed  versusCompleted
,Failure Exam   versusCompleteNot  Did Comp(s) Passed
FailureSuccessP
FailureSuccessP
 
 
Hence, the generalized ordered logit offers a particularly interesting interpretation for the 
probability depicted on the bottom row.  Given that the student passes the Theory 
Comprehensive Exam, what are the significant determinants to help him/her complete the 
dissertation from there?  
 Findings for the estimated generalized ordered logit model, which appear in Table 4, 
speak to the different skills needed in the two stages.  Significant determinants of passing the 
Theory Comp with positive effects include GRE Verbal and GRE Quantitative, Masters, Female, 
and Specific Topic.  The estimated coefficient for Age is negative and significantly different from 
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zero.  In this stage, Econ Courses show a significant compensation effect, with an estimated 
threshold of GRE Quantitative = 670.   
 The results put forth a considerably smaller number of significant determinants for the 
next step, Completion.  In particular, all the variables for GRE scores, Econ Courses, Masters, 
and Female become insignificant.  On the other hand, the findings suggest a significant 
compensation effect for completion with regard to Math Courses, with an estimated threshold of 
GRE Quantitative = 695.  They also indicate a significantly positive effect for Age in the 
Completed category.  In an interesting contrast, the results indicate that age may be a detriment 
to passing the Theory Comp.  Once beyond that stage, though, it becomes an asset for 
Completion. 
 The effect of Female presents another interesting contrast.  The estimate is positive and 
significant for the stage of Passing Comp(s) Did Not Complete, but is negative and insignificant 
for Completion.  The findings indicate that female students have the intellectual firepower and 
unobserved attributes beyond the male students to pass the comprehensive exam(s), but lose this 
advantage in the completion stage.  One possibility, based solely upon anecdotal observation, 
involves a greater tendency for females to leave the program due to personal reasons, such as 
moving to be near a significant other.            
A notably more robust finding is the significantly positive effect of the Mention Paper 
variable.  Even after controlling for talent and acquired skills, the interest in writing economics 
papers remains a significant determinant of completing the Ph.D.                
Notice that the effect of GRE scores disappears in the completion stage only within the 
sequence-driven generalized ordered logit model.  The finding suggests that both the logit and 
multinominal logit estimates that generated a significant effect of GRE scores were the result of 
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not separating the Comp(s) stages from the modeling of the Completion stage.  In the logit 
estimations, completers are compared both to failures and comp passers; the multinominal logit 
case compares completers to students who failed the theory comprehensive exam.   
 
4.  Empirical Results: Factor Analysis  
We now examine success in the Ph.D. program using factor analysis (Johnson and 
Wichern 1992).  This methodology assumes that the specific determinants of success reflect 
underlying latent behavioral factors.  Factor analysis produces estimates of the factors as linear 
combinations of the determinants.  The procedure becomes particularly advantageous when the 
data contain a large number of determinants relative to the sample size, since the number of 
factors is considerably less than the number of determinants. 
Table 5 reports the estimated factors for success in the Ph.D. program.  They appear as 
rotated factor loadings using the varimax procedure.  This rotation technique generates factors 
that describe information in the initial factors by re-expressing them, so that loadings on a few 
initial variables are as large as possible.  By construction latent variables follow a standard 
normal distribution, are orthogonal to each other, and factor loadings are constrained to one.  We 
obtain very similar results using the promax rotation, which produces non-orthogonal factors. 
The 18 determinants (including the six citizenship dummy variables) generate seven 
factors with a cumulative proportion of 95%.  While the number of factors we selected is 
somewhat arbitrary, we follow several principles suggested in this literature. If there are too few 
factors, the variables for several distinct concepts may be merged.  With too many factors, 
several factors may attempt to measure the same concept, causing the factors to get in each 
other's way.  Our experience here led us to choose seven factors. 
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A key issue in factor analysis centers on identifying the latent behavioral characteristics.  
The procedure generates the linear combinations, but gives no further information.  For a given 
factor, the researcher comes up with the behavioral characteristic(s) based upon the determinants 
with coefficients of economically important magnitudes in the linear combination.  The signs of 
these coefficients provide clues as well.  We choose to identify these behavioral characteristics a 
priori, before seeing how the factors perform in the estimated models.   
The linear combinations generating the factors appear as columns in Table 5.17  The 
general criterion we use for a determinant to be economically meaningful is for a coefficient to 
have an absolute magnitude of at least 0.20.  This magnitude tends to result in determinants that 
are significantly correlated (at the 5% level) with the estimated factor.  We do not confine 
ourselves to this criterion, though.  In Table 5, we report in boldface determinants that we feel 
are economically important in uncovering the behavioral characteristic.   
Table 5 also includes our own designations of these characteristics for each of the seven 
factors, listed as column headings.  They come from examining all the information in the linear 
combination that makes up a specific factor, within the context of students who seek Ph.D. study 
in Economics.18  Clearly this aspect of factor analysis revolves around judgment – different 
interpretations can certainly arise from the same information.  Further, some factors offer much 
easier interpretation for designations of behavioral characteristics than others. 
 We designate factor (1) as Professional Maturity.  The factor contains large positive 
coefficients for Masters and Age, and a large negative coefficient for Math Courses.  The factor 
may reflect the behavior of professionals who return to school and seek the Ph.D. in economics.  
Factor (2) strongly points to Math Talent.  This factor has GRE Quantitative as the only 
behavioral determinant with an economically meaningful coefficient.  Its positive sign and large 
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magnitude indicate that the factor measures aptitude in quantitative skills.  Factor (3) highlights 
positive and economically important impacts of Econ Courses, Masters, and Age, along with 
negative impacts of GRE Analytic and Math Courses.  We designate this factor as Economics 
Background.  The factor might reflect Masters students in economics without a strong math 
background who wish to pursue this study at the Ph.D. level. 
We refer to factor (4) as Motivation and Research Desire.  The factor contains a number 
of economically important coefficients.  The motivation aspect of the designation stems from the 
positive impact of Math Courses and Economics Courses, along with the negative impacts of 
GRE Verbal and GRE Analytic.  This result can be interpreted as students who increase their 
preparation for study in Ph.D. Economics by taking more economics and particularly math 
courses, perhaps to overcome deficiencies in overall talent.  The research desire part of the 
designation primarily comes from the large positive coefficient for Specific Topic.  The factor 
also includes a positive coefficient for Mention Paper, a significant determinant of success from 
our previous results, which has the largest magnitude among the seven factors. 
Factor (5) is designated as Undergraduate Background.  The linear combination includes 
positive and economically meaningful coefficients for all three GRE scores, although the 
magnitudes are not as large as those in factor (7).  In addition to this information, our designation 
comes from a positive impact of Econ Courses and a negative impact of Age.  The factor seems 
to reflect strong overall candidates consisting of talented younger students with Bachelors 
degrees in economics.  Factor (6) features large positive coefficients for Specific Member and 
Age, along with a large negative coefficient for Mention Paper.  We refer to this factor as 
Departmental Familiarity.  It appears to reflect the underlying behavior of possibly older 
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students with knowledge of the individual department, but who have not expressed an interest in 
writing economics papers. 
Factor (7) appears to provide a straightforward interpretation.  It includes large positive 
coefficients for all three GRE scores.  We designate this factor as Overall Intelligence, or sheer 
intellectual horsepower.  Further information comes from examining the negative coefficient for 
Specific Member.  This factor seems to reflect substantial overall talent, reflected in applicants 
who represent national candidates for Ph.D. study in economics.   
From here, we examine the effects of these factors on success in the Economics Ph.D. 
program.  We perform the same econometric investigations as before, except that we use the 
factors instead of the specific determinants.  Table 6 reports logit estimates for all three stages of 
the Ph.D. program.  Overall Intelligence is the only factor with a significantly positive effect for 
passing the Theory Comp and the Field Comp.  The estimations generate positive parameter 
estimates for Economics Background and Motivation and Research Desire, but the coefficients 
are not estimated precisely.  For the completion stage, both Overall Intelligence and Motivation 
and Research Desire have positive and significant effects. 
Multinomial logit estimates appear in Table 7.  No effects are significant in the terminal 
category of Passed Comp(s) Did Not Complete.  Math Talent, Economics Background, 
Departmental Familiarity, and Overall Intelligence all have positive effects, but are not 
estimated with precision.  Moving to the category of Completion, the results reveal significantly 
positive effects for Motivation and Research Desire as well as for Overall Intelligence.  Math 
Talent and Economics Background have positive but insignificant estimates. 
Table 8 reports generalized ordered logit estimates.  For the terminal stage of passing the 
Theory Comprehensive Exam, the findings reveal significantly positive effects for Math Talent 
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and Overall Intelligence.  Given that the student passes the Theory Comp, though, the 
significantly positive factors for Completion consist of Overall Intelligence along with 
Motivation and Research Desire. 
 
5.  Conclusion           
Our overall findings tell a coherent story about what determines success in the 
Economics Ph.D. program.  They strongly indicate that students need different skills at various 
stages.  And more directly, they point to the importance of the desire to undertake economics 
research as a key to completing the doctorate.  Along with the necessary talent and acquired tools 
that enable them to survive the comprehensive exams, interest in doing economics research plays 
a significant role for them to thrive in pursuing the dissertation.   
With the intensity of this data and the deliberate study of each step in the Economics 
Ph.D. program, these results provide scientific evidence that support anecdotal suspicions 
regarding what it takes for students to succeed.  Moreover, our study provides a blueprint for 
departments that wish to undertake such an examination of their own Ph.D. programs in 
economics, and possibly other disciplines as well.  This issue becomes particularly important in 
an era of greater program assessment.   
Our results raise questions about their general applicability to Ph.D. Economics programs 
across the US, and even worldwide.  Short of a cross-department series of investigations along 
these lines, what results might be basically peculiar to the Syracuse program or similar 
programs?  We offer several thoughts in this direction.   
First, as a mid-level program Syracuse may be more susceptible to students transferring 
and to adverse selection than higher ranked programs.  This aspect suggests that the 
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“compensation effects,” involving the significant interaction terms, may not appear for other 
programs.  Second, the Syracuse program features only four Ph.D. fields—Public Economics, 
Urban Economics, Labor Economics, and International Trade.  It may be more important for 
success at Syracuse, relative to programs with more diversity of fields, to identify applicants with 
definitive interests in these field areas.   
Third, the Syracuse program emphasizes applied research, especially since it resides 
within the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.  The program produces few 
dissertations in pure theory.  This characteristic may be important in explaining the significance 
of mentioning a paper for success.  The research papers in which nearly all these applicants 
would be involved would be those that use economic data and estimate models.  This aspect 
might be especially important given that their subsequent dissertation consists of applied 
research, albeit with more advanced theoretical methods, modeling, data, and econometric 
technique.       
Caveats aside, our study provides a number of intriguing findings regarding success in 
the Ph.D. Economics program that lend themselves to extension and further study.  Along with 
talent, our results provide empirical evidence that motivation and interest in doing economics 
research play a significant role in success, especially with completion.  This brings to mind a 
recent conversation between one of us as a Director of Graduate Studies and an applicant with 
outstanding academic credentials.  The student stated that admission directors at several Ph.D. 
programs had informed him that, “Nobody reads the personal statements.”  Perhaps they’re 
missing something. 
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Appendix: Explicit Specifications For The Estimated Models 
 
The structural models are based upon the latent variable Success*, defined as the number of 
performance units.  All models are described in terms of the ith student and the jth step, with µ 
denoting the residual and x and β defined previously. 
 
Logit 
The structural model for success is given by: 
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Multinominal Logit 
The structural model for j = 0, 1, 2, is given by: 
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Generalized Ordered Logit 
 
The structural model for j = 0, 1, 2, is given by:  
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The model is estimated using the probability specification: 
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                 Table 1 – Summary Statistics (Sample Size = 78) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable        Mean       Standard Deviation     Minimum   Maximum 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Theory Comp 0.628 0.486 0 1 
Field Comp 0.551 0.501 0 1 
Completed 0.410 0.495 0 1 
 
GRE Verbal 522.821 123.034 280 780 
GRE Quantitative 692.051 80.362 440 800 
GRE Analytic 646.154 110.773 290 800 
Math Courses 2.910 2.649 0 15 
Econ Courses 9.654 6.976 0 40 
Masters 0.295 0.459 0 1 
Mention Paper 0.462 0.502 0 1 
Specific Topic 0.667 0.474 0 1 
Specific Member 0.064 0.247 0 1 
Female 0.397 0.492 0 1  
Age 25.730 4.856 20 50 
 
American 0.590 0.495 0 1 
Chinese 0.154 0.363 0 1 
Other Pacific Rim 0.051 0.222 0 1 
Other Asian 0.103 0.306 0 1 
European 0.064 0.247 0 1 
Middle Eastern/African  0.038 0.194 0 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 2 – Logit Estimates: Determinants of Success 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Determinant/Outcome                         Theory Comp                           Field Comp                            Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
GRE Verbal 0.0107 (0.0039)** 0.0085 (0.0039)** 0.0039 (0.0030) 
GRE Quantitative 0.0849 (0.0360)** 0.0964 (0.0448)** 0.0928 (0.0337)** 
GRE Analytic 0.0532 (0.0353)   0.0606 (0.0407)   0.0618 (0.0297)**  
GRE Analytic*GRE Quantitative -0.00009 (0.00005)* -0.00009 (0.00006) -0.000088 (0.000043)** 
Math Courses -0.3739 (1.4599)  2.0141 (1.4429)  3.7170 (1.4386)** 
Math Courses*GRE Quantitative  0.0002 (0.0021)  -0.0032 (0.0021)  -0.0050 (0.0021)** 
Econ Courses 0.6411 (0.6065)  1.0523 (0.6023)* 0.9254 (0.7460) 
Econ Courses*GRE Quantitative -0.0011 (0.0009)  -0.00152 (0.00085)* -0.0013 (0.0010) 
Masters 2.4420 (0.9575)** 0.4334 (0.8876) -0.3658 (1.0003) 
Mention Paper 1.2925 (0.8660)  1.1106 (0.7983)  1.9105 (0.8105)** 
Specific Topic 0.6835 (0.8093) 0.5272 (0.7239)  0.0602 (0.7201) 
Specific Member 0.2772 (1.0965) -0.2595 (0.9807) 0.4582 (1.0762) 
Female  -0.1993 (0.7026)  0.0027 (0.6540)  -0.4339 (0.7711) 
Age -0.0906 (0.0736)   -0.0089 (0.0808) 0.1030 (0.0723) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.3393 0.3100 0.2792 
Log Likelihood -34.0078 -37.0196 -38.0615 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  All estimated models include an intercept and dummy variables for citizenship, except 
for Other Asian.  The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 3 – Multinomial Logit Estimates: Determinants of Success 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                                    Passed Comp(s) 
Determinant/Outcome                               Did Not Complete                    Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
GRE Verbal 0.0126 (0.0061)** 0.0082 (0.0037)**                
GRE Quantitative 0.0986 (0.0348)** 0.1164 (0.0354)**                  
GRE Analytic  0.0850 (0.0386)**  0.0685 (0.0326)** 
GRE Analytic*GRE Quantitative -0.00015 (0.00006)** -0.00014 (0.00005)**                     
Math Courses -6.0111 (3.3833)*  2.4962 (1.5763)        
Math Courses*GRE Quantitative  0.0080 (0.0046)*  -0.0052 (0.0022)**        
Econ Courses  -0.0219 (1.0649)    1.2782 (0.7782)* 
Econ Courses*GRE Quantitative -0.0003 (0.0014)   -0.0020 (0.0011)*                
Masters 3.8951 (1.4138)** 1.8565 (1.2160)                 
Mention Paper  -0.2792 (1.1127)  2.0343 (0.8962)**                 
Specific Topic 1.2576 (1.0459) 0.7893 (0.8788)                
Female  0.4667 (0.8830) -0.7217 (0.8190)                 
Age  -0.5148 (0.2391)**   -0.0562 (0.0797)                
 
Pseudo R2 0.3680 
Log Likelihood -52.5241 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  The estimated model includes an intercept and 
citizenship dummy variables (except for Other Asian and European) in each outcome equation.  
The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 4 – Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates: Determinants of Success 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                                    Passed Comp(s) 
Determinant/Outcome                               Did Not Complete                   Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
GRE Verbal 0.0180 (0.0057)** 0.0088 (0.0065)                   
GRE Quantitative 0.1537 (0.0923)* 0.0128 (0.0468)                     
GRE Analytic  0.1168 (0.0876)  -0.0417 (0.0523) 
GRE Analytic*GRE Quantitative -0.00019 (0.00013)   0.00006 (0.00008)                    
Math Courses -5.8363 (4.2372)      8.1993 (4.3874)*                   
Math Courses*GRE Quantitative 0.0076 (0.0063)   -0.0118 (0.0062)*  
Econ Courses  2.6792 (1.1400)**  1.2422 (0.9330)                  
Econ Courses*GRE Quantitative -0.0040 (0.0017)** -0.0015 (0.0013)    
Masters 4.9254 (1.7898)** -1.4344 (1.4721)                 
Mention Paper  1.3296 (1.1660)   2.3931 (1.2968)*                 
Specific Topic 2.1582 (0.8237)** -0.2801 (1.2415)                 
Female  2.3709 (1.2823)** -2.3585 (1.8263)                  
Age  -0.5749 (0.3400)*     0.6538 (0.2997)**              
 
Pseudo R2 0.4783 
Log Likelihood -43.3575 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  The estimated model includes an intercept and 
citizenship dummy variables (except for Other Asian and European) in each outcome equation.  
The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 5 – Rotated Factor Loadings (Varimax Rotation) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                        (1)             (2)                (3)                    (4)                      (5)                     (6)                   (7) 
                            Professional           Math               Economics       Motivation and    Undergraduate    Departmental    Overall 
Determinant/Factor          Maturity              Talent             Background     Research Desire     Background        Familiarity   Intelligence 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
GRE Verbal -0.173 -0.026 -0.084   -0.250    0.276     0.096     0.541  
GRE Quantitative -0.008  0.489  -0.032   0.065     0.280    0.162 0.472 
GRE Analytic  -0.266   0.054    -0.232     -0.215   0.286    -0.041  0.633 
Math Courses   -0.394   -0.020    -0.224    0.169     0.148    0.149 -0.208 
Econ Courses  -0.122   -0.108    0.374     0.256   0.233    -0.199  -0.055 
Masters    0.417   0.184  0.245   0.359   -0.027    0.147 -0.145 
Mention Paper -0.109    -0.021  -0.195     0.147  -0.064    -0.510 -0.036 
Specific Topic   0.039   -0.027  0.024    0.281  -0.050    0.062 0.082 
Specific Member  -0.191    -0.102 -0.124     0.154      0.170   0.356 -0.282 
Female    -0.131   0.028   0.168     -0.039     0.187   -0.502 -0.170 
Age  0.402  -0.015   0.208  0.144  -0.328    0.280 -0.112 
 
Cumulative Proportion 0.263  0.443  0.584  0.713 0.825 0.899 0.950 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Rotated Factor Loadings include citizenship dummy variables for all six groups (see Table 1).  Factor names come from the 
authors.  Numbers in bold denote important determinants for each factor, as identified by the authors.   
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Table 6 – Logit Estimates: Factors 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Factor/Outcome                Theory Comp               Field Comp                 Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Professional -0.0564 -0.3039  -0.0935 
Maturity (0.3275) (0.3628) (0.3058) 
 
Math Talent 0.4018 -0.1276  0.1539  
 (0.2908) (0.2421) (0.2446) 
 
Economics  0.3072  0.1935  0.0755 
Background (0.2725) (0.2616) (0.2357) 
 
Motivation and 0.4298  0.5707  0.7831* 
Research Desire (0.3059) (0.3907) (0.4459) 
 
Undergraduate  -0.2322 -0.3027 -0.1201  
Background (0.2319) (0.2243) (0.2352) 
 
Departmental   0.1964  -0.0421   -0.1267   
Familiarity (0.3032) (0.3260) (0.3530) 
 
Overall  0.8802** 1.0450** 0.8605** 
Intelligence (0.3319) (0.2642) (0.3027) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1354 0.1425 0.1201 
Log Likelihood -44.5014 -46.0061 -46.4589 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  All estimated models include an intercept.  The 
symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 7 – Multinomial Logit Estimates: Factors 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                             Passed Comp(s), 
Factor/Outcome                                  Did Not Complete                   Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Professional  0.0270 -0.0982  
Maturity (0.3735) (0.3474) 
 
Math Talent  0.4783  0.3644  
 (0.3321) (0.3159) 
 
Economics  0.4419  0.2446 
Background (0.3132) (0.2964) 
 
Motivation and -1.2951   0.6516* 
Research Desire (1.3617) (0.3997) 
 
Undergraduate  -0.2859  -0.2133  
Background (0.2994) (0.2580) 
 
Departmental  0.5126   0.0769   
Familiarity (0.4487) (0.3621) 
 
Overall  0.6564   1.0488** 
Intelligence (0.4362) (0.3609) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1304 
Log Likelihood -72.2634 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Each equation in the estimated model includes an 
intercept.  The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Table 8 – Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates: Factors 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                              Passed Comp(s), 
Factor/Outcome                                  Did Not Complete                   Completed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Professional  0.0480   0.0321  
Maturity (0.3617) (0.3050) 
 
Math Talent  0.5446*   0.1657  
 (0.3087) (0.2665) 
 
Economics  0.3663  0.0761 
Background (0.2749) (0.2492) 
 
Motivation and   -0.6475     2.0732* 
Research Desire (0.5914) (1.1303) 
 
Undergraduate   -0.2647  -0.0743  
Background (0.2449) (0.2505) 
 
Departmental -0.1467   -0.2197   
Familiarity (0.3137) (0.3733) 
 
Overall  1.0017** 0.8930*  
Intelligence (0.4038) (0.5090) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1616 
Log Likelihood -69.6749  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Each equation in the estimated model includes an 
intercept.  The symbols * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 For a study of the admission selection process itself, see Marsh and Zellner (2004). 
 
2 National data on completion rates into doctoral programs are not systematically 
collected, but Ehrenberg (1992) reports completion rates ranging from 40-70 percent for 
economics students at selected research universities, over 90 percent at major medical schools, 
over 98 percent at the top 20 law schools, and 80-95 percent at top MBA programs. 
 
3 While the first two-year economics Ph.D.’s were awarded by Harvard, Yale, and Johns 
Hopkins in the 1870s, by 1900 dissertations became more sophisticated and specialized, 
indicating professional skills rather than the mark of a cultured gentleman (Hansen 1991). 
 
4 Their ten schools are the University of California (Berkeley), Chicago, Columbia, 
Cornell, Harvard, the University of Michigan, Princeton, Stanford, the University of North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill).  For a damning critique of that book, see McCloskey (1994). 
 
5 Bowen and Rudenstine (1992) report that economics completion rates are generally 
below the natural sciences and above political science and the humanities (Table G.7-1, p. 400). 
 
6 Espenshade and Rodriguez (1997) reach similar conclusions using Bowen and 
Rudenstine’s data set plus the University of Pennsylvania.  
 
7 They measured student quality with A-level scores, whether the degree was first class, 
and whether the student had attended a polytechnic or college.   Only highly aggregated subject 
areas mattered, with arts and languages having lower and science and engineering having higher 
completion rates than the social science students. 
 
8 Van Ours and Ridder (2003) use a competing risks model to study completion rates of 
Economics Ph.D. students at three Dutch universities, emphasizing the role played by the 
student’s thesis supervisor.    
 
9 The output of Economics Ph.D.s was extremely concentrated in the early 1920s, but 
since the late 1970s constitutes a much more diverse market.  A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
the output of economics doctorates exceeded 1000 in the early 1920s, but has hovered around 
200 in the last three decades (Scott and Anstine 1997).  
 
10Beginning in the 2003-04 academic year, the Analytic part of the GRE exam was 
replaced with a writing section with scores of 1.0-6.0, with 6.0 the best.  These applicants are not 
included in our sample.   
 
11A number of GRE validity studies, for example, estimate whether GRE scores are good 
predictors of first and second year graduate school grades.   For a summary of over 600 such 
studies, see Schneider and Briel (1990). 
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12 The other ex ante determinants of job placement are the subjective ratings of the 
admission committee and the prominence of the reference letter writers. 
 
13 We also recorded Grade Point Averages in math, economics, and overall.  However, 
we find that we lost too many observations when we include this data, especially due to different 
grading structures across schools and countries. 
 
14 We also examine letters of recommendation, but could not come up with any usable 
measures based upon this information.  Most letters consist of non-specific positive information 
about the applicants.  Although Krueger and Wu (2000) find that having a letter from a 
prominent economist is a key determinant of later career success, we can’t identify a 
straightforward criterion for prominence, much less prominence across different fields.   
 
15 Unfortunately, we cannot use a dummy variable for minority status for an American 
student.  Our observations do not include a minority student who completed the dissertation. 
       
16 The dummy variables are insignificant, for the most part.  The results show some 
evidence of significance toward success in the early steps for the Middle Eastern/African group.  
This result may reflect the self-paying status of many Middle Eastern Ph.D. students.  We find 
little if any significance in the citizenship dummy variables in the estimations for completion.  A 
complete set of results is available from the authors upon request.  
 
17 We do not use the interaction terms for the factor analysis.  In that case, the technique 
tended to produce large coefficients for the determinant and the interaction term with the same 
determinant.  The factors and the subsequent estimation results are similar to those reported here.               
 
18 Although we include the citizenship dummy variables in the factor analysis, we refrain 
from using the magnitudes of their coefficients for designating factors to avoid any stereotyping. 
